We propose a new approach toward assessing sovereign risk by examining rigorously the health and aggregate default risk of a nation's private corporate sector. Models such as our new Z-Metrics™ approach can be utilized to measure the probability of default of the non-financial sector cumulatively for five years, both as an absolute measure of corporate risk vulnerability and a relative measure compared to other sovereigns and to the market's assessment via the liquid credit-default-swap market. Specifically, we measure the default probabilities of listed corporate entities in ten European countries, and the U.S.A., covering the recent global financial crisis period and the subsequent European sovereign crisis, the latter of which is still with us today, in 2013. We conclude that our transparent corporate health index measured at periods prior to the explicit recognition by most credit professionals, not only gave an effective early warning indicator but provided an appropriate hierarchy of relative sovereign risk. We argue that a more complete assessment of the health of a sovereign by utilizing publicly available firm financial data, as well as the standard macroeconomic data approach, provides greater transparency as to a nation's fundamentally based default likelihood. Policy officials should, we believe, nurture, not penalize, the tax revenue paying and jobs generating private sector when considering austerity measures of distressed sovereigns.
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source of national wealth, and of the financial health of sovereigns, is the economic output and productivity of their companies. To the extent we are correct, such an approach could provide financial professionals and policy makers with a more effective means of anticipating financial trouble, with enhanced transparency thereby enabling them to understand the sources of problems before they become unmanageable.
In the pages that follow, we introduce Z-Metrics™, as a practical and effective tool for estimating sovereign risk. Developed in collaboration with the Risk Metrics Group, now a subsidiary of MSCI, Inc., Z-Metrics is a logical extension of the Altman Z-Score technique that was introduced in 1968 and has since achieved considerable scholarly and commercial success.
Of course, no method is infallible, or represents the best fit for all circumstances. But by focusing on the financial health of private enterprises in different countries, our system promises at the very least to provide a valuable complement to, or reality check on, standard "macro" approaches.
But before we delve into the details of Z-Metrics, we start by briefly reviewing the record of financial crises to provide some historical perspective. Next, we attempt to summarize the main findings of the extensive academic and practitioner literature on sovereign risk, particularly those studies designed to test the predictability of sovereign defaults and crises.
With that as background, we then present our new Z-Metrics system for estimating the probability of default for individual (non-financial) companies and show how that system might have been used to anticipate many developments during the current EU debt crisis. In so doing, we make use of the most recent (2008 -2012) publicly available corporate data for ten European countries, both to illustrate our model's promise for assessing sovereign risk and to identify the scope of reforms that troubled governments must consider not only to qualify for bailouts and 5 subsidies from other countries and international bodies, but to stimulate growth in their economies.
More specifically, we examine the effectiveness of calculating the median and 75 th percentile company five-year probability of default of the sovereign's non-financial corporate sector, both as an absolute measure of corporate risk vulnerability and a relative health index comparison among a number of European sovereigns, and including the U.S. as well. Our analysis shows that this health index, measured at periods prior to the explicit recognition of the crisis by market professionals, not only gave a distinct early warning of impending sovereign default in most cases, but also provided a sensible hierarchy of relative sovereign risk. We also show that, during the current European crisis, our measures not only compared favorably to standard sovereign risk measures, notably credit ratings, but performed well even when compared to the implied default rates built into market pricing indicators such as CDS spreads (while avoiding the well-known volatility of the latter). Indeed, our 75 th percentile measure, clearly showed that countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy were in much worse shape in 2008 and 2009 than the implied probabilities of default from the closely watched CDS market indicated, and that only in 2010 did the CDS market raise more concern than our firm fundamental approach. Interestingly, both measures seem to be converging in late 2012.
Our aim here is not to present a "beauty contest" of different methods for assessing sovereign risk in which one method emerges as the clear winner. What we are suggesting is that a novel, bottom-up approach that emphasizes the financial condition and profitability of a nation's private sector, including banks as well as non-financial firms, can be effectively combined with standard analytical techniques and market pricing to better understand and predict sovereign health. Our analysis has one clear implication for policy makers: that the reforms 6 now being contemplated should be designed, as far as possible, to preserve the efficiency and value of a nation's private enterprises, especially as austerity measures become less and less popular with important electorates, like Italy in 2013.
What's more, our firm default measure will be applied to listed companies in each of our European and USA samples and, as such, the results are clearly transparent using models that are now certainly available to most Central Banks and professional analysts, although these models may not be exactly the one we use -"Z-Metrics."
Modern History Sovereign Crises
When thinking about the most recent financial crisis, it is important to keep in mind how common sovereign debt crises have been during the last 150 years-and how frequently such debacles have afflicted developed economies as well as emerging market countries. Figure 1 shows a partial list of financial crises (identified by the first year of the crisis) that have occurred in "advanced" countries. Overall, Latin America seems to have had more recent bond and loan defaults than any other region of the world (as can be seen in Figure 2 ). But if we had included a number of now developed Asian countries among the "advanced" countries, the period 1997-1999 period would be much more prominent. however, the country was downgraded to BB-, a "junk" rating, and the county's government avoided default only through a $50 billion bailout by the IMF. And it was not just the rating agencies that were fooled; most of the economists at the brokerage houses also failed to see the problems looming in Korea. 1989 Brazil 1898 , 1902 , 1914 , 1931 , 1939 Canada 1873 , 1906 , 1923 , 1983 Czechoslovakia 1870 , 1910 , 1931 China 1921 , 1939 Denmark 1877 , 1885 , 1902 , 1907 , 1921 , 1931 , 1987 DEU 1880 , 1891 , 1901 , 1931 GBR 1890 , 1974 , 1984 , 1991 Greece 1870 , 1894 , 1932 , 2009 Italy 1887 , 1891 , 1907 , 1931 , 1930 , 1935 , 1990 Japan 1942 Netherlands 1897 , 1921 , 1939 Norway 1899 , 1921 , 1931 , 1988 Russia 1918 , 1998 Spain 1920 , 1924 , 1931 , 1978 Sweden 1876 , 1897 , 1907 , 1922 , 1931 , 1991 USA 1873 , 1884 , 1893 , 1907 , 1929 , 1984 Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) Other studies, however, suggest that sovereign credit spreads are more related to global aggregate market indexes, including U.S. stock and high-yield bond market indexes, and global 3 One excellent primer on sovereign risk is Babbel's (1996) study, which includes an excellent annotated bibliography by S. Bertozzi on external debt capacity that describes many of these studies. Babbel lists 69 potentially helpful explanatory factors for assessing sovereign risk, all dealing with either economic, financial, political, or social variables. Except for the political and social variables, all others are macroeconomic data and this has been the standard until the last few years. Other work worth citing include two practitioner reports-Chambers (1997) and Beers et al (2002) -and two academic studies- Smith and Walter (2003) , and Frenkel, Karmann and Scholtens (2004) . Full citations of all studies can be found in References section at the end of the article. 4 Including Grinols (1976) , Sargen (1977 ), Feder and Just (1977 ), Feder, Just and Ross (1981 , Cline (1983) , Schmidt (1984), and Morgan (1986) . 5 Gray, Merton and Bodie (2006, 2007) 6 See Baek, Bandopadhyaya and Chan (2005) . Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010) observe that aggregate risk factors drive banking and sovereign market risk spreads in the Euro area; and in a related finding, Sgherri and Zoli (2009) suggest that Euro area sovereign risk premium differentials tend to move together over time and are driven mainly by a common time-varying factor.
capital flows than to their own local economic measures. 7 Such evidence has been used to justify an approach to quantifying sovereign risk that uses the local stock market index as a proxy for the equity value of the country. Surprising many observers, the average Z-Score for South Korea at the end of 1996 suggested that it was the most financially vulnerable Asian country, followed by Thailand, Japan, and
Indonesia. As noted earlier, Korea's sovereign bond rating in 1996 was AA-(S&P). But within a year, Korea's rating dropped to BB-; and if not for the IMF bailout of $50 billion, the sovereign would almost certainly have defaulted on its external, non-local currency debt. A traditional macroeconomic measure like GDP growth would not have predicted such trouble since, at the end of 1996, South Korea had been growing at double-digit rates for nearly a decade.
13
The Z-Metrics™ Approach See Pomerleano (1998) , which is based on a longer article by the author (1997). Taking a somewhat similar approach, many policy makers and theorists have recently focused on the so-called "shadow banking system." For example, Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2010) argued that the financial strength of governments depends on private financial markets and its ability to attract foreign capital. They concluded that strong financial institutions not only attract more capital but their presence also helps encourage their governments to repay their debt. Chambers of S&P (1997) also mentions the idea of a "bottom-up" approach but not to the assessment of sovereign risk, but to a corporate issuer located in a particular country. He advocates first an evaluation of an issuer's underlying creditworthiness to arrive at its credit rating and then considers the economic, business and social environment in which the entity operates. These latter factors, such as the size and growth and the volatility of the economy, exchange rates, inflation, regulatory environment, taxation, infrastructure and labor market conditions are factored in on top of the micro variables to arrive at a final rating of the issuer. 13 Afterwards, the World Bank and other economists such as Paul Krugman concluded that that crony capitalism and the associated implicit public guarantees for politically influential enterprises coupled with poor banking regulation were responsible for the crisis. The excesses of corporate leverage and permissive banking were addressed successfully in the case of Korea and its economy was effectively restructured after the bailout.12 model of 1968. Our objective was to develop up-to-date credit scoring and probability of default metrics for both large and small, public and private, enterprises on a global basis.
In building our models, we used multivariate logistic regressions and data from a large sample of both public and private U.S. and Canadian non-financial sector companies during the 20-year period 1989-2008. 15 We analyzed over 50 fundamental financial statement variables, including measures (with trends as well as point estimates) of solvency, leverage, size, profitability, interest coverage, liquidity, asset quality, investment, dividend payout, and financing results. In addition to such operating (or "fundamental") variables, we also included equity market price and return variables and their patterns of volatility. Such market variables have typically been used in the "structural distance-to-default measures" that are at the core of the KMV model 16 now owned by Moody's.
In addition to these firm-specific, or micro, variables, we also tested a number of macroeconomic variables that are often used to estimate sovereign default probabilities, including GDP growth, unemployment, credit spreads, and inflation. Since most companies have a higher probability of default during periods of economic stress-for example, at the end of 2008-we wanted to use such macro variables to capture the heightened or lower probabilities associated with general economic conditions.
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The final model, which consists of 13 fundamental, market value, and macroeconomic variables, is used to produce a credit score for each public company. (And as discussed later, although our primary emphasis was on applying Z-Metrics to publicly traded companies, we also created a private firm model by using data from public companies and replacing market value with book value of equity.)
The next step was to use a logit specification of the model (described in the Appendix)
that we used to convert the credit scores into probabilities of default (PDs) over both one-year and five-year horizons. The one-year model is based on data from financial statements and market data approximately one year prior to the credit event, and the five-year model includes up to five annual financial statements prior to the event.
To test the predictive power of the model and the resulting PDs, we segregated all the companies in our sample into "cohorts" according to whether they experience "credit events"
that include either formal default or bankruptcy (whichever comes first). All companies that experienced a credit event within either one year or five years were assigned to the "distressed"
or "credit event" group (with all others assigned to the non-distressed group).
Our test results show considerable success in predicting defaults across the entire credit spectrum from the lowest to the highest default risk categories. Where possible, we compared our output with that of publicly available credit ratings and existing models. The so-called "accuracy ratio" measures how well our model predicts which companies do or do not go bankrupt on the basis of data available before bankruptcy. The objective can be framed in two ways: (1) maximizing correct predictions of defaulting and non-defaulting companies (which statisticians refer to as Type I accuracy) and (2) minimizing wrong predictions (Type II accuracy).
14 As can be seen in Figure 3 , our results, which include tests on actual defaults during the period 1989-2009, show much higher Type I accuracy levels for the Z-Metrics model than for either the bond rating agencies or established models (including an older version of Z-Scores).
At the same time, our tests show equivalent Type II accuracies at all cutoff levels of scores.
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Perhaps the most reliable test of credit scoring models is how well they predict critical events based on samples of companies that were not used to build the model, particularly if the events took place after the period during which the model was built (after 2008, in this case).
With that in mind, we tested the model against actual bankruptcies occurring in 2009, or what we refer to as our "out-of-sample" data. As with the full test sample results shown in Figure 3 , our Z-Metrics results for the "out of sample" bankruptcies of 2009 outperformed the agency ratings and the 1968 Z-score and 1995 Z"-score models using both one-year and five-year horizons. 18 We assessed the stability of the Z-Metrics models by observing the accuracy ratios for our tests in the in-sample and out-of-sample periods and also by observing the size, signs and significance of the coefficients for individual variables. The accuracy ratios were very similar between the two sample periods and the coefficients and significance tests were extremely close.
FIGURE 3
Type I error for Agency ratings, Z"-score, and Z-Metrics agency equivalent (AE ratings (1989 (AE ratings ( -2008 : one year prediction horizon for publicly owned firms Having established the predictive power of our updated Z-score methodology, our next step was to use that model (which, again, was created using large publicly traded U.S. companies) to evaluate the default risk of European companies. And after assuring ourselves that the model was transferable in that sense, we then attempted to assess the overall creditworthiness of sovereign governments by aggregating our Z-Metrics default probabilities for individual companies and then estimating both a median default probability and credit rating for different countries.
In conducting this experiment, we examined ten key European countries over the time Metrics PD is arbitrary, implying as it does that fully 50% of the listed companies have PDs higher than 11.9%.)
We also observed that several countries had relatively high standard deviations of Z- (with just two publicly owned, not state owned, entities). As noted above, we are working on a model which, we hope, will deal with these two issues. As noted above, we will revisit, in a subsequent paper, the banking sector PD estimation when we are more confident about the accuracy and robustness of our prediction model.
CDS Implied PDs
Note also that the weighted-average PD model's rankings are very similar to the rankings based on the CDS implied PDs (last column in Figure 7 ). The main discrepancy is that of Belgium, which ranked eighth based on its CDS PD compared to third based on our weightedaverage PD. Italy's CDS PD's ranking was two rankings better (7) based on its CDS implied PD compared to our weighted-average PD (9).
FIGURE 7
Weighted 
Comparing Private Sector Fundamental PDs with CDS Market Implied PDs
Now that we have defined and empirically measured our new approach toward assessing sovereign PDs --a type of "Bottom-Up" approach, --we can compare our measure with market implied estimates. Figures 8-12 show the time series of the 75th percentile 5-year PD from our Z-Metrics model compared to the 5-year implied PD from CDS spreads over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . In all cases, our 75th percentile PD was greater (worse) for all five PIIGS countries from the start of the time series at year-end 2008 until about mid-2010 when the CDS market's PD assessment first overtook our estimate. It was that point in 2010 that investors realized that not only countries like Greece and Portugal were exceptionally risky, but the very survival of the Eurozone was in jeopardy of falling apart. Our PD estimates showed extreme concern much earlier because our measures are not impacted by the likelihood, or not, of a political bailout by the stronger Eurozone countries, and especially by pronouncements by the ECB. Figure 4 and Riskmetrics (MSCI).
Correlation of Sovereign PDs: Recent Evidence on Z-Metrics vs. Implied CDS PDs
As a final test of the predictive of our approach, we compared our Z-Metrics five-year median PDs for our sample of nine European countries (both on a contemporary basis and for 12.0%), while the Z-Metrics PD was relatively stable in the two years (7.5% and 6.5% 31 respectively). 22 In 2010, whether we calculate the correlation with or without Ireland, the results are essentially the same (0.82 and 0.83).
Given the predictive success of Z-metrics in the tests already described, we were curious to find out whether it could be used to predict capital market (i.e., CDS) prices. So, we regressed our public firm model's 2008 Z-Metrics median, non-financial sector PDs against implied CDS PDs one year later in 2009. Admittedly, this sample was quite small (10 countries) and the analysis is for only a single time-series comparison (2008 vs. 2009 ). Nevertheless, these two years spanned a crucial and highly visible sovereign debt crisis, whereas the PDs implied by prior years' Z-Metrics and CDS showed remarkably little volatility.
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As can be seen in Figure 14 , the correlation between our Z-Metrics PDs and those implied by CDS one year later proved to be remarkably strong, with an r of 0.69 and R 2 of 0.48.
In sum, the corporate health index for our European countries (plus the U.S.) in 2008 explained roughly half of the variation in the CDS results one year later.
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A potential shortcoming of our approach is that we are limited in our private sector corporate health assessments to data from listed, publicly held firms. This is especially true for relatively small countries like Ireland (with just 28 listed companies), Portugal (with 30), Greece (79), Netherlands (61), and Spain (82). Since the private, non-listed segment is much larger in 22 No doubt the CDS market was reacting quite strongly to the severe problems in the Irish banking sector in 2009, while Z-Metrics PDs were not impacted by the banks. This implies a potential strength of the CDS measure, although the lower CDS implied PD in early 2010 was not impressive in predicting the renewed problems of Irish banks and its economy in the fall of 2010. 23 The last time an entire region and its many countries had a sovereign debt crisis was in Asia in 1997-1998. Unfortunately, CDS prices were not prominent and the CDS market was illiquid at that time. 24 Several other non-linear structures (i.e., power and exponential functions) for our 2009 Z-Metrics vs. 2010 CDS implied PDs showed similar results. In all cases, we are assuming a recovery rate of 40% on defaults in calculation of implied sovereign PDs.
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all of the countries, we are not clearly assessing the health of the vast majority of its firms and our sovereign health index measure is incomplete.
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But if the size of the listed firm population is clearly a limitation in our calculations, there does not seem to be a systematic bias in our results. To be sure, the very small listings in Ireland, Portugal, and Greece appear heavily correlated with their high PDs, but the country with the lowest PD (the Netherlands) also has a very small listed population. Another potentially important factor is that the listed population in countries like the U.K. and the Netherlands is represented quite heavily by multinational corporations that derive most of their income from outside their borders.
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Conclusion and Implications
As the price for bailing out distressed sovereigns, today's foreign creditors, especially the stronger European nations, are demanding a heavy dose of austerity. Several governments, including those of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and the U.K., have already enacted some painful measures. Others, such as France and Hungary, have either resisted austerity measures or faced significant social unrest when austerity measures have been proposed. These measures typically involve substantial cuts in cash benefits paid to public workers, increases in retirement age, and other reduced infrastructure costs, as well as increased taxes for companies and individuals. The objective is to reduce deficits relative to GDP and enhance the sovereigns' ability to repay their foreign debt and balance their budgets.
While recognizing the necessity of requiring difficult changes for governments to qualify for bailouts and subsidies, we caution that such measures should be designed to inflict as little damage as possible on the health and productivity of the private enterprises that ultimately fund the sovereign. The goal should be to enable all private enterprises with clear positive going concern values to pay their bills, expand (or at least maintain) their workforces, and return value to their shareholders and creditors (while those businesses that show no promise of ever making a profit should be either restructured or liquidated). For this reason, raising taxes and imposing other burdens on corporate entities is likely to weaken the long-run financial condition of sovereigns.
Austerity programs have other non-intended consequences and in one recent high profile case, Italy in 2013, resulted in a change in government. Electors voted out the technocrat government led by Mario Monti, and gave large popular support to heretofore unknown political parties which attacked reforms. Some of these austerity reforms were important and necessary, 35 yet hugely unpopular with Italian voters, despite their embrace by the most powerful European governments, particularly in Northern Europe.
To better estimate sovereigns' risk of default, we propose that traditional measures of macroeconomic performance be combined with more modern techniques, such as the contingent claims analysis pioneered by Robert Merton and the bottom-up approach presented in these pages. Along with the intuitive appeal of such an approach and our encouraging empirical results, the probabilities of sovereign default provided by aggregating our transparent PD estimates across a national economy can be seen, at the very least, as a useful complement to existing methods and market indicators-one that is, again, totally transparent and not subject to government manipulation of publicly released statistics. Using our approach, the credit and regulatory communities could track the performance of publicly held companies and the economies in which they reside-and by making some adjustments, analyze unlisted entities as well. And if sovereigns were also willing to provide independently audited statistics to the public on a regular basis, so much the better. 
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